The issues have been divided into catagories in order to make the information you are specifically interested in more accessible.

1. Types of Voting Machines

2. Ownership of Elections

3. What we need for secured voting

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TYPES OF VOTING MACHINES

In 2002 Congress passed the Help American Vote Act (HAVA) in order to provide disabled citizens the ability to vote independently and privately.  The consequences of this law have been widespread for voting technology.  Starting this year, it outlawed all punchcard and lever machines (although some states have received extensions and will still use them for the 2006 elections).  The law was also used by some election officials and the voting machine vendors to promote electronic voting all accross the nation.

While old fashion hand counted paper ballots are still allowed in some states most states and localities have chosen to either adopt either Optical Scan or Direct Record Electronics (DREs-also called Touchscreens). 

Optical scan works just like a standardized test in schools.  A voter marks a paper ballot with a pen and that ballot is fed into a reader that records the vote and drops the ballot into a locked ballot box.  Optical scan by design provides for a voter-verified paper ballot that contains the voters intent for any recounts and audits.  Optical scan is the cheapest system available.  It provides for quick results while maintaining important safeguards necessary for ensuring accurate elections.  For disabled voters there is a device that works with optical scan called the Automark.  This device does not tabulate votes but instead allows a voter will all types of disabilities to mark an optical scan paper ballot.  Only one optical scan machine and one ballot marking device are needed per precinct.

Direct Record Electronics (DREs-also called Touchscreens) are the most expensive solution available.  Each precinct requires many of these machines and the number of voters that can vote at any given time is limited to the number of functioning machines.  This creates large lines and long waiting times for voters.  Compounding this issue is the fact that they often break down leaving jurisdictions short on voting equipment.  These machines are very vulnerable to tampering.  Some DREs provide a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) that prints on a thermal receipt roll under a display window for the voter to see.  These are better than nothing but often result in paper jams and have no preservation of voter intent from the voter themselves on record.  Most DREs however are completely paperless.  There is no way to do recounts.  There is no way to audit elections.  There is no way to ensure accuracy.  This provides a perfect storm that allows vote-tampering and programming errors to occur without any ability detect them, prove they occured, or ascertain the correct election results.  These DREs are the greatest threat to our Democracy today, far greater than any risk we could suffer from enemies abroad.

The choice is very clear.  States and localities should adopt optical scan voting systems that are more reliable, more secure, and cheaper.  However, even optical scan machines are subject to a programming error that can miscount votes, so we must have mandatory random auditing of those voter-marked paper ballots to the machine count to be safe and secure.

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OWNERSHIP OF ELECTIONS

Voting machines used today are all designed by private companies.  The outsourcing of our election process is a very dangerous situation, especially with the lack of oversight and verification of the vote by election officials and the public.  These voting machines are subject to testing but in the opinion of respected computer scientists they are at best woefully inadequate.  The programming source code (what actually counts the votes) is propriatary to the companies, meaning a few private computer programmers working for private companies, actually control the vote totals of our elections here in the United States.  We must require state inspection of the secret programming code to ensure bugs and errors are not part of the software counting our nation's votes.

Although there are many voting machine companies the four main ones are Diebold, ES&S, Hart Intercivic, and Sequoia.

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WHAT WE NEED FOR SECURED VOTING

With voting technology there is no system that can be completely secure.  The only way to have secured voting is to have verification of the vote.  In order to achieve verified voting we must have three main protections and few other safeguards.

Voter-Verified Paper Ballot:  This is the first and foremost protection for our vote.  Every voting system must have a paper record of the ballot that the voter verifies is correct and is the ultimate authority for determining the true vote in an audit or recount.  The best system for accomplishing this requirement is the optical scan ballot, since the voter themselves marks the ballot and therefore original intent is preserved. DREs can be equiped with printers but these ballots are not marked by the voter, hard to recount, and not as durable as standard full page paer ballots. See our previous discussion of the types of voting machines.

Mandatory Random Audits:  Paper records alone are not enough.  A tabulation error could miscount ballots fed through an optical scan reader.  The only way to make sure the machine tabulation is correct is to randomly audit a percentage of machines to see if the paper count matches the machine count.  When there is an inconsistancy, we can then expand the count and ascertain the true and correct election results. If we find no inconsistancies then we can be almost positive the election results are true and accurate and the citizens and candidates alike can be confident in the results.  The percentage of the random audit is different from state to state where it has been adopted but it ranges from 2% to 10%.  We feel 5% is a satisfactory number.

Inspection of the Source Code:  As an added safeguard and to establish a chain of evidence in case of malfunction, we must have state inspection of the source code, or programming code, used to run the tabulation software of the voting machines.  This provides accountability of the companies that sell voting machine equipment.  If they mess up elections either through intentional malfesiance or through technical neglagence, we need an ability to ascertain what occured and be able to hold the company or people responsible to account.  Also the added review BEFORE the election increases the chance we will catch mistakes or fraud before they occur.  It also serves as a deterant: If a company knows there products will be under review they are more likely to strive for a better work product.

Other Safeguards:  It is important to ensure control and security of the voting machines themselves by election procedure.  Voting machines should not be left in unlocked facilities and should not be sent home with precinct election officials prior to the election (what we can voting machine sleepovers).  Election results should be printed at the precincts before tabulation in a central tabulator.  Memory cards must have a clear chain of custody.  Wireless devices should NEVER be used in voting machines (SEVERAL ALREADY DO). Tabulation computers should not be hooked up to internet or intranet connections.  Election results should not be transmitted by modem from the precincts to the central office.

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